University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019
2005

Investigating Economic Inequality And Voter Turnout In The
Industrialized Democracies
Benjamin Freeman
University of Central Florida

Part of the Political Science Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Freeman, Benjamin, "Investigating Economic Inequality And Voter Turnout In The Industrialized
Democracies" (2005). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 319.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/319

INVESTIGATING ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND VOTER
TURNOUT IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES

by

Benjamin Freeman
B.S. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2003

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term
2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. iii
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................... 4
Institutional Explanations ............................................................................................... 4
Political Explanations ..................................................................................................... 6
Socioeconomic Explanations .......................................................................................... 7
The Importance of Inequality.......................................................................................... 9
DATA AND METHODS ................................................................................................. 18
Economic Variables ...................................................................................................... 20
Controlling For The Institutional Context .................................................................... 24
Controlling For The Political Context .......................................................................... 25
RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 26
Welfare State Development .......................................................................................... 31
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 34
CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................... 39
APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL ANALYSES FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
........................................................................................................................................... 41
APPENDIX B: COUNTRIES AND ELECTION YEARS INCLUDED IN THE
ANALYSIS....................................................................................................................... 44
LIST OF REFERENCES.................................................................................................. 46

ii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Economic Models of Turnout............................................................................. 27
Table 2: Models of turnout including institutional, political, and economic variables .... 29
Table 3: Models of turnout grouped by level of welfare state development .................... 32
Table 4: Comparison of GDP and inequality means by decade ....................................... 37

iii

INTRODUCTION
The idea that economic conditions influence the electoral process is far from
novel. In fact social scientists have been exploring this interplay for more than three
decades, beginning with the works of Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Mueller (1970), and
Kramer (1971), which illustrate the link between the economy and voting behavior in US
presidential and congressional elections. Since the time of these initial studies the
economic voting literature has become immense and expanded rapidly beyond single
country temporal models to analyze international variations in the impact of the economy
on turnout and the support given to different parties, with the latter receiving the vast
majority of attention. While the field of economic turnout research can trace its roots
back to Anthony Downs (1957) there remains a substantial void in our understanding of
how the economy affects turnout as evidenced by the paucity of relevant research.
Though it has been shown that aggregate macroeconomic performance affects turnout
rates (Radcliff 1992; Radcliff 1994; Pacek and Radcliff 1995b, 1995c; Aguilar and Pacek
2000) the impact of economic distribution has yet to be analyzed. “What are the electoral
effects of rising income inequality and insecurity? We can cite no published scientific
paper on that exciting question” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 212).
In this paper I seek to answer the question posed by Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier by
analyzing the effect of changes in economic inequality on changes in voter turnout. While
it is evident that the state of the macroeconomy has an impact on turnout, this is only one
measure of economic performance. Another option is to employ a measure of economic
distribution alongside macroeconomic performance measures such as gross domestic
product (GDP) that measure the overall growth or decline in the economy. Though it is
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true that GDP growth must benefit some or all socioeconomic groups, without a measure
of economic distribution it is impossible to tell who benefits from this growth. Theories
of electoral mobilization and withdrawal are predicated on the assumption that the
consequences of economic decline are felt primarily by the lower classes, however it is
quite possible that economic decline could come as the result of losses incurred primarily
by the upper classes. Thus, previous studies that have found changes in GDP or similar
figures to be statistically significant predictors of turnout can offer no empirical
explanation as to how or why this change occurs.
This analysis will seek to remove part of this mystery by accounting for the way
in which the overall economic ‘pie’ is sliced. Fluctuations in economic inequality can
affect turnout in two ways. First, as in the case of GDP, voters may turnout to vote based
upon their preferences for equality, which are independent of the economy’s impact on
their personal finances. While this effect has not been empirically supported Mutz and
Mondak (1997) find support for what they call ‘sociotropic fairness’, “Our respondents
were substantially more likely to judge the president favorably if they felt that class
groups had experienced similar rather than dissimilar changes in economic performance”
(304). It is important to note that the findings of Mutz and Mondak apply to presidential
popularity and not the propensity to turnout, nonetheless their work shows the importance
of equality in shaping political preferences. On the other hand, the second way in which
inequality can affect turnout has been readily documented. There exists a socioeconomic
bias in electorates wherein the propensity to vote is higher in the upper socioeconomic
groups than it is in the lower socioeconomic groups. When economic inequality
increases more voters may fall into socioeconomic groups where their propensity to vote
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is reduced. Thus, fluctuations in the level of economic distribution combined with the
socioeconomic bias should reveal an inverse relationship between the level of inequality
and the level of electoral participation.
In the next section this possibility will be investigated in greater detail along with
other plausible alternative explanations of turnout. It will be noted that the institutional
and political contexts have been shown to be stronger predictors of turnout in crossnational perspective than have socioeconomic factors. However, it will also be argued
that socioeconomic factors are significant, particularly economic inequality, and that the
socioeconomic bias is a recognized phenomenon in the industrialized democracies.
Additionally, an argument will be made that studies which have found the level of
welfare state development to be an important intervening variable in determining the
economy’s impact on voter turnout are actually capturing the effects of economic
distribution on turnout.
The data and methods section will discuss the coding of the variables used to test
these conjectures, and the pooled model used to investigate these relationships. The
results section will clearly show that socioeconomic explanations of turnout are
significant, even when controlling for institutional and political explanations of turnout.
Specifically, it will be unambiguously shown that economic distribution is more
important in determining voter turnout in cross-national perspective than is economic
growth. Finally, it will be shown that economic inequality is a significant explanation of
turnout regardless of the level of welfare state development. When accounting for
inequality, the effects of welfare state development on turnout are contrary to those found
in previous studies.
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I will analyze these findings in the discussion section and the implications for
democratic accountability and responsiveness will be addressed. In the conclusions
section an agenda for future research will be presented and it will be argued that
measures of economic distribution should be included in future studies of turnout,
particularly in regions of the world beyond the industrialized sample utilized here.
Furthermore, it will be necessary to investigate the effect of fluctuations in economic
distribution on vote choice, while being aware of the effects of these fluctuations on
electoral participation. It will also be argued that further analysis is needed to determine
if higher turnout does in fact lead to reductions in inequality.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Though the literature investigating the relationship between the economy and
turnout is somewhat sparse there is a plethora of research investigating turnout from other
perspectives. The different approaches can be summarized into three groups. The first
approach advocates the importance of political institutions in determining turnout. The
second approach contends that the political context of individual elections is a significant
predictor of voter turnout, while a third approach argues for the value of socioeconomic
variables.

Institutional Explanations
Democracies come in a multiplicity of forms. While all democracies guarantee
some level of political participation for at least some citizens a variety of variables have
been shown to have a significant influence on the level of turnout across countries.
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Registration laws that require even the most limited amount of effort have been found to
depress turnout during the 20th century (Gosnell 1930; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).
Registration laws represent an additional cost of voting and from a rational choice
perspective where the benefits of voting are already low even a small added cost could
create a significant reduction in aggregate levels of turnout.
Further, the electoral system can have a strong impact on voter turnout. In
proportional representation (PR) systems fewer votes are wasted than in plurality
systems. Under PR systems there is a greater probability that a vote is worth more and
thus the perceived benefits of voting are increased. Lijphart (1994a) finds that the average
number of parties is 2.0 in plurality, 2.8 in majority, and 3.6 in PR systems, thus under
PR voters have more available options. PR systems also encourage the political parties to
implement mobilization efforts in all geographical areas, including those that would
likely be ignored by parties in plurality systems (Lijphart 1997). Not surprisingly it has
been shown that in PR systems turnout is approximately ten percentage points higher
than in plurality systems (Blais and Carty 1990; Franklin 2002; Lijphart 1994b). Within
PR systems there are also varying degrees of proportional representation due to decisions
about districting, formulas, tiers, and thresholds. Thus, institutionalists also feel that as
the degree of disproportionality between the share of votes and the share of seats rises
voter turnout will fall (Jackman 1987).
Even under PR systems turnout might still be depressed if voters are called to the
polls too often. This appears to correspond with governments in which there is a
separation of powers or widespread use of referendums (i.e. Switzerland and the United
States). These two factors together serve to reduce the importance of any one electoral
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contest and increase costs by repeatedly calling voters to the polls. Not surprisingly,
Franklin (2002) finds that salient elections (as measured by these two criteria) have
turnout rates almost 30 percent higher than non-salient elections.
Throughout the literature the most consistent and strongest stimulus to voter
turnout is compulsory voting. If the decision to vote is a rational choice for voters (and a
very precarious one at that) then it follows that the best way to overcome a problem of
collective action is to adopt legal sanctions to ensure participation (Olson 1965). Perhaps
the most striking aspect of research on compulsory voting is that it has such a profound
effect even though the penalties for non-compliance are often negligible and enforcement
is limited or non-existent. According to Lijphart’s (1997) review of the literature
compulsory voting increases turnout by seven to sixteen percentage points.

Political Explanations
While institutional variables account for a large amount of between country
differences there is also considerable variance in the political context within countries
from one election to the next. The most obvious of these factors is the competitiveness of
elections. In one election an incumbent party that has performed well while in office in
the eyes of voters may win in a landslide while in the very next election a strong
opposition party may rise up to defeat the incumbent party by the slimmest of margins.
In both cases the costs of voting remain equal while the benefits are very different. In the
former, the benefit of voting for either the incumbent or an opposition party is low
because the gulf between the two is so great, whereas in the latter, voters perceive that
there is a higher benefit for voting (Blais 2000). Therefore, the more competitive an
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election is the more likely it is that turnout will increase. Franklin (2002) finds that
competitive elections give rise to turnout differences of four to eight percent.
The same argument for competitiveness also applies to the leading party or
coalition’s proximity to majority status. A party with majority control of government has
much greater control of policy outputs than do leading parties that control less than a
majority of the government. Therefore the benefit of voting increases with the perceived
proximity of the leading parties vote share to 50 percent. Regardless of party preference
it becomes logical for an individual to vote because the stakes of the contest are high.
Franklin (2002) was the first to utilize this variable and he found that it led to turnout
differences between four and eight percent.

Socioeconomic Explanations
Socioeconomic explanations of turnout contend that social and economic
variables affect turnout at both the individual and aggregate levels. If voters are affluent,
educated, and literate the likelihood that they will actually vote is increased (Filer,
Kenny, and Morton, 1993). At the individual level researchers utilize surveys to
ascertain the socioeconomic characteristics of voters and non-voters, while at the
aggregate level researchers utilize literacy, education, economic growth, unemployment,
and inflation rates. Often the greatest trouble is that the socioeconomic characteristics are
highly correlated with one another. For instance, higher wealth often comes as the result
of higher education and thus it can be difficult to determine which variable is having the
most influence. Moreover, in comparative studies it can be taxing to attempt to make
comparisons regarding levels of educational attainment due to the diversity of
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educational systems found throughout the world. Much of the comparative literature has
relied upon measures of economic development or economic growth such as GDP per
capita or similar measures as the principal independent variable. One pioneering work,
conducted by Radcliff (1992) shows that the election year proportion change in real per
capita national income did have a significant influence on turnout. The effect was
dependent upon the level of welfare state development and the relationship was found to
be curvilinear, where mobilization (higher turnout) occurred at low and high levels of
welfare state development while withdrawal (lower turnout) was found in moderate
welfare states during periods of economic decline. This work, which was later supported
by Pacek and Radcliff (1995b), might have captured an effect that it was not intended to.
Welfare spending is the principal means of government control over economic
distribution; incidentally welfare spending is also the quickest and most effective control
of economic inequality. Thus, what matters most might not be changes in the level of
welfare state development or economic growth, but changes in the level of economic
inequality.
Governments can modify welfare and taxation systems to suit the interests of their
supporters or constituents. For instance, conservative parties can opt to reduce the tax
burden on the upper class and consequently reduce the amount of government funds
available for redistribution. Egalitarian parties may opt to increase taxation and spread
the resultant public income amongst the lower classes. Most importantly, this legislation
can be enacted, realized, and experienced within the short time span between elections. It
is therefore quite probable that partisan politicians advocate alteration of welfare
spending because of the effect that it has on changes in the level of economic distribution,
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which in turn leads to fluctuations in turnout and consequently party support. What is
most disturbing is that as Radcliff (1994) has shown governments are able to avoid
punishment during times of recession thanks in part to voter abstention, presumably
amongst those most disadvantaged by the economic decline. In terms of economic
distribution, governments that pursue inegalitarian policies might not be punished
because the people most adversely affected by the new policies just so happen to be the
same groups that are now less likely to vote. This possibility will be discussed in greater
detail later in this paper.

The Importance of Inequality
The central thesis of this research is that economic distribution is a significant
predictor of voter turnout. When inequality rises it is assumed that turnout will fall,
because a large portion of the electorate will fall into socioeconomic classes that are less
inclined to vote. On the other hand, when inequality falls turnout will rise as a greater
portion of the electorate move into socioeconomic classes where the mean probability of
voting is higher. But, why should changes in economic distribution matter? After all, one
person’s loss is another’s gain and the overall financial well-being of the country is
unchanged. It is apparent that inequality is a complex phenomenon that requires further
elaboration in order to understand its electoral ramifications.
To begin, when inequality rises it does so unequally (Wade 2004). While this
may seem redundant it is important to know that inequality is much more than the rich
getting richer while the poor become poorer. The direct economic exchange that this
theoretical notion implies is simply not found in the empirical data. There is no rich
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group that extracts an equal amount of money from a group of poor people and then
divides it up amongst an equal number of rich individuals. Inequality is just as apparent
within classes as it is between classes. Though the rich may get richer while the poor
become poorer there are rich individuals who gain significantly more so than other rich
individuals.
Most importantly, the sizes of socioeconomic groups are unequal. As of 2000 the
combined wealth of the 200 most affluent individuals in the world was equal to the
combined annual income of the poorest 2.5 billion people in the world (Gates 2000).
While this statistic is on the global level, the same basic fact holds true in individual
countries. As of 1990 35.5 percent of all US households had gross incomes below
$20,000 while only 3.9 percent had incomes above $100,000 (Levy 1993). If the lower
class bound is increased to $40,000 then 66.7 percent, or roughly two-thirds, of all
households are considered lower class. Thus, for every upper class household there are
two lower class households. Similar statistics show this finding to be consistent among
all the industrialized nations under study here.
Compound this with the aforementioned notion that inequality is unequal within
classes and it becomes obvious that increases in inequality punish far more people than
they reward (Wade, 2004). In a democracy where there is perfect equality of the vote,
when a poor man’s vote has the same weight as a rich man’s, pursuing policies that
further inequality might seem to be political suicide. Yet conservative parties all over the
world advocate, either directly or indirectly, such policies and have been rewarded for
their efforts (i.e. President Ronald Reagan in the US and Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher in the United Kingdom). One possible explanation for this is the upper class
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bias inherent in electorates. According to this argument, which has been empirically
illustrated in nearly all industrialized democracies, there is a direct correlation between
affluence and the probability of voting or otherwise participating in politics. According
to a recent American Political Science Association (APSA) Task Force Report US survey
respondents with incomes over $75,000 were 34 percent more likely to vote than were
individuals with incomes below $15,000 (APSA Task Force 2004). When inequality
rises the income of the more affluent who are more likely to vote rises which in turn
makes them more likely to vote, whereas the income of the less affluent falls (relatively)
which in turn makes them less likely to vote. Thus, it is quite probable that those who
would punish the incumbent party abstain at a much higher rate than those rewarded by
inegalitarian policies (Radcliff 1994).
Considering that the socioeconomic bias is the principal theoretical mechanism
that links fluctuations in economic inequality to voter turnout a review of the literature
documenting the socioeconomic bias and its implications for this research follows.

The Socioeconomic Bias
Ironically, the generally accepted belief at the close of the 19th century was that
the socioeconomic bias would work in favor of the economically disadvantaged. It was
believed that a rational individual would opt to abstain rather than have his vote “drown
among the votes of the great crowd” (cited in Tingsten 1937, 184). Studies of the
socioeconomic link with turnout in Chicago (Gosnell 1927) and a small town in Ohio
(Arneson 1925) soon showed that the turnout bias was in fact in favor of the upper class.
Tingsten (1937) in a review of turnout studies across several nations came to the
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conclusion that turnout rises with socioeconomic status. Since that time there has been
little debate about the direction of socioeconomic bias in political participation.
Socioeconomically biased turnout has been documented repeatedly in the United
States and the APSA Task Force Report on American Democracy in an Age of Rising
Inequality is the latest contribution to research on the socioeconomic bias inherent in the
American electorate. In addition this work also provides documentation of the rising rate
of inequality over the same time period that turnout fell steadily. According to the task
force’s analysis the most affluent fifth of the American electorate received 47.7 percent
of family income in 2001 (APSA Task Force 2004, 652), but this is not shocking
considering that the top quintile has always held a great proportion of overall income in
the US. “What stands out over the past three decades is the sharp and unmistakable
increase in the concentration of income at the top” (APSA Task Force 2004, 652).
Critical to this analysis is the observation that the number of Americans who have
attained upward mobility does not even begin to counter the rise in economic disparities
among the masses.
Of equal importance is the task force’s conclusion that unequal economic
resources lead to unequal political participation rates. This is also supported by the
argument of Richard Freeman (2004) that increased levels of economic inequality lead to
lower turnout rates among the lower classes. Additionally, the task force finds that
American government is much more responsive to the desires of the affluent minority
than to the needs of the masses (i.e. Schattschneider 1960). Within campaigns and
political parties this is also true. Though the work of Rosenstone and Hansen (1993)
shows that mobilization is important in encouraging citizens to vote, the task force finds
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that party mobilization efforts are biased towards the more affluent constituents in both
parties (i.e. Verba 1996). The work of Rosenstone and Hansen does have important
relevance for the analysis presented here however. The authors find that as the number of
participants in a political activity (voting or otherwise) decreases inequality in
participation rises (1993, 238). Furthermore, Rosenstone’s (1982) previous work
illustrates that the probability of electoral participation decreases not just because of
poverty, but also because of a decline in financial well being, which is precisely the effect
hypothesized here.
While the United States appears to display the strongest evidence of an upper
class bias in political participation, so strong in fact that some analysts have regarded it as
exclusively American (Abramson 1995; Piven and Cloward 1998), the same phenomenon
has been observed in other democracies. Similar to the findings of Rosenstone and
Hanson in the United States, studies by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) and Marsh and Kaase
(1979) have shown that the socioeconomic bias in political participation is also evident in
other countries.
The socioeconomic bias is more pronounced in countries with lower levels of
voter turnout. Not surprisingly there is a great deal of evidence documenting the
socioeconomic bias in Switzerland, which, along with the US has turnout rates that
routinely fail to reach fifty percent of the voting age population. The participation gap
between the least and most educated classes averaged nearly 25 percentage points in
referenda voting between 1981 and 1991 (Mottier, 1993). In 1991 the gap was 37
percentage points and Linder (1994, 95-96) refers to this as a “typical profile of a popular
vote.”
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Conversely, the class bias is less pronounced in countries with high levels of voter
turnout. Topf (1995) actually finds several instances in which the socioeconomic bias
works in the opposite direction as would be expected, with the less educated being more
likely to vote than the higher educated. Overall though for every deviant case such as
this Topf finds four more with the expected pattern, and studies by Oppenhuis (1995) and
Dalton (1996) reach approximately the same conclusion. When countries that adopt
compulsory voting measures, and consequently have very high turnout rates, are
excluded from analyses such as these the upper class bias becomes even more apparent.
Yet even in countries that adopt compulsory voting the socioeconomic bias is still
apparent. McAllister (1986) finds that fluctuations in turnout correspond to fluctuations
in party support in Australia. In a cross national analysis of 19 industrialized
democracies that included several countries that had adopted compulsory voting Pacek
and Radcliff (1995a) discover a similar pattern. “The results imply that the left share of
the vote increases by about one-third of a point for every percentage point increase in
turnout” (139). It is interesting to note that the authors also included a dummy variable
for mandatory voting, which was found to be insignificant.
Not only is the socioeconomic bias still apparent in countries where compulsory
voting is adopted, though much less so, it also appears that if compulsory voting laws are
abolished a strong socioeconomic bias will be reintroduced. In countries that have done
away with compulsory voting, such as the Netherlands, it has been shown that the class
bias increased significantly (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978). In 1967 under compulsory
voting turnout rates were above 90 percent for all five educational classes in the
Netherlands. Whereas in the 1970 election when the country was no longer under
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compulsory voting the turnout gap between the lowest and highest educational groups
was 21 percent (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, 7). Studies of the potential abolishment of
compulsory voting in other countries also reveal that a strong class bias would result. For
instance, Ackaert and De Winter (1993; De Winter and Ackaert 1994) find that
abolishment of compulsory voting in Belgium would reduce turnout by more than 30
points, which would result in a very strong upper class bias in the electorate. Baloyra and
Martz (1979) reach a similar conclusion in the case of Venezuela.

The Socioeconomic Bias and Fluctuations in Economic Distribution
It is apparent that the socioeconomic bias in political participation is a real
phenomenon in the US and in democracies around the world. The propensity to turnout
increases with the level of education and income (which not surprisingly are highly
correlated). It is important to note that the level of education and income are relative
values within countries. The top quintile in Venezuela is much less affluent than the top
quintile in the US, yet socioeconomic bias has been identified in both countries. In short,
what matters in understanding the socioeconomic bias and consequently turnout is
relative deprivation and not absolute deprivation. Though absolute depravation
undoubtedly matters in explaining turnout the socioeconomic bias does not explicitly
speak to this and a lengthy discussion of absolute deprivation related to turnout is beyond
the scope of this paper.
If relative income is positively correlated with turnout then it should follow that
when economic distribution becomes more unequal, with the top quintile accruing a
higher share of total income, voter turnout will fall. The rationale for this is that the
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upper classes are already predisposed to vote, while turnout among the lower classes is
largely dependent on their level of income. Thus, when economic inequality increases it
places a greater portion of the population into socioeconomic groups where the
probability of voting is lower.
This implicitly assumes that the number of voters resulting from a heightened
socioeconomic status change does not offset the number of abstainers resulting from a
lower socioeconomic status change. Simply, the relationship between income and
propensity to turnout cannot be linear. If it were then fluctuations in economic
distribution would have no recognizable impact on turnout. The change in the probability
of turnout must be larger at lower levels of income than at higher levels or vice versa in
order to discern any recognizable change in turnout as the result of fluctuations in the
distribution of income. The literature supports the former pattern. As previously stated it
is clear that the socioeconomic bias is reduced as turnout rises, accordingly turnout
increases tend to stem from the less affluent classes. Additionally, Pacek and Radcliff
(1995a) clearly show that increases in turnout benefit leftist parties that tend to favor
egalitarian policies and it is unlikely that increases in turnout stemming from the upper
classes would lead to a higher vote share for more egalitarian parties. From a theoretical
perspective then it is expected that any turnout fluctuations resulting from fluctuations in
the level of economic distribution are the consequence of higher changes in the
probability of turnout among the lower socioeconomic groups compared to the upper
socioeconomic groups.
In summation, it is expected that rising income inequality will result in lower
turnout because more potential voters are falling into socioeconomic groups where the
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probability of voting is significantly diminished. This effect will not be offset by the
increased probability of voting resulting from upward mobility, because the change in
voting propensity is greatest at the lower levels of the economic distribution. This
proposition is far from novel; in fact for almost a century political scientists have found
that “voting frequency rises with rising social standard” (Tingsten 1937, 155).

Welfare State Development
Powell and Whitten (1993) find that clarity of government responsibility for the
economy is a significant determinant of the economy’s impact on voter preferences,
which is supported by Anderson (2000) and Palmer and Whitten (2002). Thus, it
follows that those aspects of the economy that governments have greater control over
during their tenure should be the most salient in determining the level of voter turnout.
Governments have control over the level of economic distribution through taxation and
redistributive programs. Taxation, and particularly progressive taxation, pulls money
directly from the most economically advantaged and through welfare spending
governments are able to give that money to more disadvantaged sectors of the population.
Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and Radcliff (1995b) document this connection between
welfare spending and economic voting. In the latter piece the authors find that high
levels of welfare spending serve to mitigate the effect of economic conditions on the vote
and in countries with mid to low level welfare systems there is a strong “positivity bias”,
meaning that governments are rewarded for good economic performance but not
punished for poor economic performance. Considering that welfare spending has an
impact on economic inequality it is possible that the welfare state effects observed by
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Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and Radcliff (1995b) were actually the result of the welfare
state altering the level of inequality and subsequently voter turnout. I believe that when
welfare spending is high economic inequality will be low and because inequality is low
voter turnout will be high because of the socioeconomic bias mechanism previously
mentioned.
Furthermore, it is generally recognized that the level of welfare state development
is fairly constant over time as Pacek and Radcliff observe. Yet, individual governments
(those that serve from one election to the next) are capable of enacting changes in welfare
spending that alter the level of inequality during the short time span between elections.
In short, Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and Radcliff (1995b) have shown that welfare state
development matters when analyzing voter turnout in comparative perspective; this
analysis will attempt to explain why.

DATA AND METHODS
To test these conjectures the analysis presented below uses a pooled time-series
dataset of elections for 20 countries from 1970-1999. The countries are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
and the United States.1 Countries were chosen based upon the availability of inequality
data and consequently the sample is composed exclusively of Western democracies. The
elections analyzed are all parliamentary elections during the period under study with the
exception of the United States. United States vote totals are for presidential elections,
due to the high salience of presidential elections in that country. Due to inequality data
1

For a list of the elections analyzed see Appendix B
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limitations this provides a pool of 157 elections. The analysis is conducted using
standard linear regression. I also tested a cross sectional time series random effects
regression model and the results were not significantly different.2
The dependent variable is voter turnout. There are several options for measuring
it; the actual number of voters can be divided by the: number of registered voters; voting
age population (VAP); voting age citizens; population eligible to vote. Adopting the first
approach overestimates the actual turnout because registering is itself an act of
participation, and thus participation is being measured strictly among those that are
already inclined to participate. The third and fourth measures also overestimate voter
turnout, though not as dramatically as the first, because estimates of the citizen
population and the number of eligible voters are notoriously inaccurate and a significant
amount of those removed from the denominator actually do cast ballots, regardless of the
legality of that action. Measuring turnout using voting age population is also flawed,
because not all of the voting age population is entitled to vote. Varying amounts of noncitizens and other disenfranchised individuals such as convicted criminals are included in
the denominator (Franklin 2002). However, of the four measures VAP is the only
conservative measure and for the purposes of this research an underestimation is more
appropriate than an overestimation because the effects exhibited on turnout using VAP
would also be significant using the other measures of turnout.

2

For an explanation of appropriate methods for working with time series cross sectional data see Beck and
Katz (1995)
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Economic Variables
The principal independent variables to be evaluated in this analysis are economic,
and they include: GDP change, unemployment change, inflation, and inequality change.
GDP is measured in constant 1995 US dollars, gathered from The World Bank’s
Development Data Group. Using constant US dollars allows for reliable spatial and
temporal comparisons, and measuring on a per capita basis controls for population
effects. GDP change is measured as the percentage change in GDP. Calculating this
figure as a percentage change controls for the different sizes of the economies under
study. For example, between 1978 and 1979 Portugal’s GDP per capita in constant
dollars rose by $285.90 while Luxembourg’s rose by $541.10, thus if overall GDP
change were used it would appear that Luxembourg’s economy grew much more than
Portugal’s, while in actuality the percentage change in growth is almost two percent
higher for Portugal. In line with the aforementioned notion that individual governments
have difficulty making meaningful changes to the economy in the short run the change in
GDP is measured from the year preceding the election as opposed to the year of the last
election. This captures election year changes, which are the most proximate and
prominent during campaigns and when the electorate actually votes. All of the economic
variables are measured using change from the year preceding the election. I hypothesize
that when GDP falls turnout will fall, corresponding to the findings of Radcliff (1992)
who also studies a set of industrialized nations. The principal hypothesis regarding GDP
is that it will attain significance when not accounting for inequality (as it has in prior
analyses), but when the effects in the change of inequality are accounted for it will lose
its explanatory power.
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Unemployment change is calculated as the percentage change in the
unemployment rate from the preceding year. Adopting a percentage measure is also
valuable for unemployment data because there is high variance in the average
unemployment rate between countries. Between 1982 and 1983 the unemployment rate
rose by a mere .3 in Iceland, which was five times less than the rate increase in Ireland,
yet the percentage change in unemployment was 43 percent in Iceland and only 16
percent in Ireland. The purpose of using a percentage measure here, just as in GDP, is to
account for the economic context. Countries with higher unemployment rates such as
Ireland might celebrate miniscule unemployment rate hikes that would infuriate Icelandic
voters. I hypothesize that when controlling for economic growth and distribution,
increased unemployment will lead to higher turnout because of a grievance asymmetry or
a ‘negativity bias’ in the electorate.
The inclusion of unemployment change in this analysis also serves the substantive
purpose of demonstrating that unemployment cannot be used as a surrogate measure of
economic inequality. The unemployment rate is purely a measure of the percentage of
the population that would like to work but cannot, which is only one aspect of the level of
economic distribution. While it might be argued that the unemployment rate is a good
determinant of the level of inequality and that the two are highly correlated the analysis
presented below reveals that this is not the case. In fact, the correlation between
inequality change and unemployment change in the industrialized sample utilized here is
miniscule.3
Inflation is simply the inflation rate during the election year in each case.
Inflation is ordinarily calculated as the percentage change in the consumer price index
3

See Appendix A
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from one year to the next, so without any further computation the current inflation rate
conforms to the coding of the other economic variables. As with unemployment, I
hypothesize that when controlling for economic growth and distribution, increased
inflation will lead to higher turnout because of a grievance asymmetry in the electorate.
For the purposes of this analysis it is important to control for inflation because
fluctuations in economic distribution are irrelevant if we do not know how these changes
actually affect the purchasing power of voters. In this analysis it is believed that
reductions in inequality increase turnout due to a larger portion of the population falling
into socioeconomic classes where the propensity to vote is higher. But, without
controlling for inflation it is impossible to determine if fluctuations in economic
distribution are advantageous to the lower classes. When inequality falls the potential
gains in turnout could be counteracted by heightened inflation. Thus, beyond its
particular impact on turnout it is imperative that inflation be included in the models
presented below.
The principal independent variable to be included in this analysis is inequality
change. While there are a variety of ways to measure inequality the most commonly
adopted approach is to use the gini coefficient (Galbraith and Kum 2002). When
inequality is low the gini coefficient is small. The primary problem with the gini
coefficient, as with all inequality data, is availability. Deninger and Squire (1996)
compiled the first comprehensive international time series of gini coefficients. Though
the data set is immense the number of figures with national coverage in their ‘acceptable
data set’ is just over 700 and the dataset is plagued with missing data, which makes
meaningful calculation extremely difficult. Galbraith and Kum (2004), working under the
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University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) provide a solution to this by merging the
Deninger and Squire data with United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO) measures of manufacturing pay inequality and other variables to provide a
consistent and stable data set of household income inequality. This data set is highly
correlated with the Deninger and Squire data set and includes data for a significant
number of years that were missing or were otherwise unreliable. Thus, this analysis
adopts the UTIP-UNIDO data set.
Like GDP, measuring the change in inequality from the previous year is
advantageous because it captures election year changes that will be the primary influence
on the decision to vote. Though it is possible that inequality could rise before this twoyear time frame it is believed that voters can more readily adapt to these changes before
the election than they can when changes take place during the year preceding the
election. Additional analyses confirm this hypothesis, so for the sake of brevity only the
measures of inequality from the year preceding the election will be reported here.
The central hypothesis regarding the inequality variable is that when inequality
rises turnout will fall as a larger portion of the voting age population falls into
socioeconomic classes where the average propensity to vote is lower. Thus, when
inequality rises withdrawal will result. Conversely, when inequality falls a larger portion
of the voting age population will rise into socioeconomic classes where the average
propensity to vote is higher. Therefore, when inequality falls it is expected that
mobilization will result.
As Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and Radcliff (1995b) have shown the level of
welfare state development can dramatically influence the effect of the economy on

23

politics. This proposition will be analyzed in a model that groups countries into either
high or moderate levels of welfare spending. The hypothesis here is somewhat different
than that of Radcliff, because I control for changes in inequality. As previously
mentioned, I believe that the effects of the welfare state on turnout observed by Radcliff
(1992) are actually the result of the welfare state altering the level of inequality and
subsequently voter turnout. Thus, when controlling for changes in economic inequality it
is hypothesized that there will be no difference in the effect of the economy (GDP,
inflation, unemployment, and inequality) on turnout when comparing high and moderate
welfare countries. In both the high and moderate models I believe that the coefficient of
inequality will be statistically significant and have a negative direction of effect.

Controlling For The Institutional Context
Institutional explanations of turnout typically include variables such as nationally
competitive districts (Fornos, Power and Garand 2004), electoral disproportionality
(Lijphart 1984; Franklin 2002), unicameralism (Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller
1995), and compulsory voting (Franklin 2002; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995).
Because this paper is primarily concerned with the influence of the economy on turnout it
is not vital to determine the individual significance of these institutional variables,
therefore country dummy variables will be utilized. These dummy variables combined
with the use of a lagged turnout variable, “effectively embody the institutional,
constitutional, and developmental factors that affect long-term turnout levels,” according
to Radcliff (1992, 445).
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Controlling For The Political Context
Though the dummy variables encompass spatial constraints on turnout it is also
important to account for temporal variation in turnout that results from changes in the
political context. When the value of the vote rises it is expected that turnout will also rise
(Jackman 1987; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1990; Franklin 2002). Here the value of the vote
is based on the proximity of the two leading parties’ vote shares and the majority status of
the leading party or coalition.
Competitiveness is the absolute value of the difference between the incumbent
party’s vote share and the strongest opposition party’s vote share in the current election.
Though this variable measures the outcome of election campaigns and not the anticipated
outcome of elections themselves it is probable that there is a high correlation between
election outcomes and intensity of campaigns. It is hypothesized that as the margin of
victory falls turnout will rise.
Majority status, which was first introduced by Franklin (2002), is measured as the
leading party’s vote share minus fifty percent. In most democratic governments a simple
majority is all that is required to enact legislation or change policy, thus it follows that the
closer a party’s perceived vote share is to majority status then the more important the
election becomes in determining future policy outputs. Elections in which the leading
party is significantly above or below majority status do not carry the same weight with
voters, because the value of the vote affecting future policy outputs is diminished.
Consequently, it is hypothesized that turnout will increase as the leading party’s vote
share approaches majority status.
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Some scholars hold the belief that time since the last election has a significant
influence on turnout (Boyd 1981). However there is limited variation in this variable
among the industrialized democracies (most countries have elections every 2-5 years) and
thus previous research has found this variable to be insignificant (Franklin 2002). Time
since last election was analyzed here and the same insignificant conclusions were found
and the exclusion of this variable from the models did not significantly alter other
variables in the analysis, so the models shown below omit this variable.

RESULTS
To begin, I will analyze a basic economic model of turnout for all of the countries
in the analysis, without controlling for the institutional or political context. Perhaps the
most striking aspect of these models is that all of the variables are highly significant, with
the exception of GDP change in Model 2.
Model 1 excludes inequality from the analysis and the remaining measures of the
economy are highly significant, with both inflation and unemployment change having p
values below .001 and GDP change having a p value below .01. The direction of the
effect is positive for all three variables, which is consistent with all of the corresponding
hypotheses. GDP change produces a positive sign, which confirms the withdrawal
hypothesis argued by Radcliff (1992), wherein economic decline leads to lower rates of
turnout in the industrialized democracies. The positive direction of effect on both
inflation and unemployment change corresponds to the grievance asymmetry hypothesis
or the negativity bias found in some electorates4. The magnitude of effect for both
variables is very high, indicating dramatic gains in turnout when these variables increase,
4

For an explanation of the grievance asymmetry see Pacek and Radcliff, 1995c
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which would presumably not be advantageous for the incumbent government responsible
for the economic malfeasance.

Table 1
Economic models of turnout
Variable
Inequality Change

Model 1
----

R2

.406***
(.104)
3.314***
(1.053)
1.106**
(.391)
.707***
(.016)
.137

Model 2
-2.781***
.865
.246**
(.083)
1.982**
(.844)
.208
(.332)
.769***
(.014)
.161

N

179

157

Inflation
Unemployment Change
GDP Change
Constant

Notes:
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Dependent
Variables is voter turnout. Standard errors are given in
parentheses below the coefficients.5
* - Significant at the .05 level
** - Significant at the .01 level
*** - Significant at the .001 level

Model 2 in Table 1 includes inequality change, which is highly significant with a
p value below .001. The direction of the effect is in the hypothesized direction indicating
that increases in inequality lead to reductions in turnout and the strong magnitude of
effect tells us that for every one point increase in inequality turnout falls by slightly less

5

Data sources:

Turnout- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
Unemployment- US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economics Web Institute
Inflation-Economics Web Institute, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistics Canada
Inequality- University of Texas Inequality Project
GDP- Penn World Tables
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than three percentage points. The magnitude of the effect is reduced for both inflation
and unemployment change, however both remain highly significant and their effects are
in the hypothesized direction. GDP change is highly insignificant with a standard error
that is more than fifty percent larger than its coefficient. The insignificance of GDP and
the overwhelming significance and strength of inequality confirms the aforementioned
hypothesis that what matters in explaining turnout is not economic growth, but economic
distribution. It must be noted though that the R² for the second model does not increase
dramatically with the inclusion of inequality change, the net result is a small change in
the percent of variation in turnout explained.6
Though the analysis in Table 1 supports all of the expectations regarding the
economic variables the explanatory power of the model leaves much to be desired.
Furthermore, like turnout, inequality varies much more between countries than it does
within them, and without controlling for institutional and political context variables in a
pooled model it is impossible to tell whether or not the observed effects are simply due to
institutional and political differences between countries. When controlling for
institutional and political context if inequality is able to maintain its significance and
magnitude we can be much more confident of its importance in the turnout function.
Table 2 displays the results of this rigorous test with the inclusion of the country
dummy variables and previous turnout which account for the institutional context, and
competitiveness and majority status, which account for the political context. The models,
as a whole, are very strong predictors of the variance in turnout and the economic
variables retain much of their significance in these models. In Model 3 inflation and
6

The reduced sample size in Model 2 (N=157) reflects inequality data limitations.
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unemployment change have p values below .01 while GDP change is significant at the
.05 level. The directions of the effects remain positive as before, but the magnitudes are
significantly diminished from the pure economic model of turnout. The political context
variables, majority status and competitiveness, are significant at the .01 and the .001 level

Table 2
Models of turnout including institutional, political, and
economic variables
Model 3
Variable
Model 4
Inequality Change
----1.186**
(.393)
Inflation
.0987**
.0773*
(.042)
(.044)
Unemployment Change
.843**
.717*
(.35)
(.341)
GDP Change
.303*
.220
(.147)
(.145)
Majority Status
.207**
.238***
(.073)
(.076)
Competitiveness
-.166***
-.169***
(.049)
(.050)
Previous Turnout
.423***
.311***
(.082)
(.088)
Constant
.532***
.635***
(.076)
(.080)
R2
.902
.905
Number of observations

168

157

Notes:
Table omits country dummy variables. Entries are
unstandardized regression coefficients. Dependent Variable
is voter turnout. Standard errors are given in parentheses
below the coefficients.7
* - Significant at the .05 level
** - Significant at the .01 level
*** - Significant at the .001 level

7

Data sources:

Competitiveness and Majority Status measures derived from data provided by: wikipedia,
parties-and-elections.de, Adam Carr’s election archive (Australia)
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respectively. The direction of effect is in the hypothesized direction for both models. In
elections where the leading party approaches 50 percent turnout rises by an average of .2
percentage points for every percentage point reduction in the gap between the leading
party’s vote share and 50 percent. Competitiveness is measured as the incumbent party’s
vote share minus the leading opposition party’s, so the negative sign reveals that when
elections are not close voters opt to abstain at a rate of a little more than one and a half
percentage points for every ten point increase in the vote share gap. It is interesting to
note that this figure was also calculated as the absolute difference between the two
leading parties with no regard for incumbency status and this measure of competitiveness
(not reported here) was found to be insignificant. Perhaps it is the ousting or the
maintaining of an incumbent party that draws voters to the polls and not simply
competition. As for the institutional variables, previous turnout is significant at the .001
level, and nearly all of the country dummy variables are significant at the .05 level or
greater.
Model 4 in Table 2 adds inequality change into the model of voter turnout with all
of the institutional, political, and economic variables. The political context variables and
previous turnout are all significant at the .001 level or better. The directions of their
effects remain unchanged and the magnitudes of their effect are not appreciably different
from Model 3, with the exception of previous turnout, which lost approximately 25
percent of its magnitude with the inclusion of inequality change. Of the four economic
variables included in the model inequality change has by far the strongest association
with turnout and is more significant than any of the other economic variables (b=-1.186,
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p=.003). For every one-point increase in the level of inequality turnout falls by slightly
more than one percentage point. Inflation and unemployment change remain significant,
but at the .05 level, and the magnitudes of their effects are reduced. Most importantly,
when accounting for the level of inequality GDP change is no longer significant at the .05
confidence level and the magnitude of effect is reduced by roughly a third. Though GDP
change performed better in Model 4 than it did in Model 2 its insignificance provides
further support for the hypothesis that the economic variable which matters most in
explaining turnout in comparative perspective is economic distribution, not economic
growth.

Welfare State Development
As previously mentioned Radcliff (1992) found welfare state development to be
an important determinant of the economy’s influence on turnout. I argue that the
observed effect could actually be an economic distribution effect related to the level of
welfare state development. To test this conjecture I divide the sample of countries into
high and low welfare states. The level of welfare state development is based upon Gosta
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) country ratings of “socialist” criteria, which accounts for
welfare program universalism and degree of equality in the benefit structure. The
moderate welfare states are: Australia, Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, and the United States. The high welfare states are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
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Radcliff found that economic growth had a positive effect on turnout in moderate
welfare states and no effect or a negative effect in extreme welfare states. In response to
economic decline voters withdraw in moderate welfare states and mobilize in extreme
welfare states. As Table 3 reports, when accounting for changes in inequality the results
here do not support Radcliff’s findings, in fact the results are the complete opposite of

Table 3
Models of turnout grouped by level of welfare state
development
Level of Welfare
Variable
Inequality Change

High
Model 5
-1.407**
(.579)
Inflation
.0896*
(.049)
Unemployment Change 1.035*
(.525)
GDP Change
.343*
(.195)
Majority Status
.174
(.107)
Competitiveness
-.0941
(.071)
Previous Turnout
.417***
(.112)
Constant
.512***
(.101)
R²
.859

Moderate
Model 6
-.945*
(.536)
.0272
(.110)
.464
(.446)
.07256
(.227)
.457***
(.117)
-.313***
(.076)
.108
(.147)
.741***
(.116)
.946

Number of observations 87

65

Notes:
Table omits country dummy variables. Entries are
unstandardized regression coefficients. Dependent Variable is
voter turnout. Standard errors are given in parentheses below
the coefficients.
* - Significant at the .05 level
** - Significant at the .01 level
*** - Significant at the .001 level
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Radcliff’s findings. GDP change is positive in both models, indicating withdrawal,
significant at the .05 level in the model of high welfare states, but not significant in the
model of moderate welfare states. It appears that when accounting for inequality,
changes in economic growth are only relevant in high welfare states. Perhaps the
economic effect that Radcliff observed in the moderate welfare states was the result of
income fluctuations altering the level of economic distribution and subsequently levels of
turnout. This would explain why inequality is statistically significant in Model 6 while
GDP is insignificant.
The importance of inequality cannot be understated in these models. Inequality
change is the only variable to attain statistical significance in both models. The
magnitude of effect is also very strong indicating an almost one percentage point decline
in turnout for every one-point increase in inequality in moderate welfare states and nearly
a one and a half point decline in turnout for every one point increase in inequality in high
welfare states. The higher magnitude and significance in the high welfare states indicates
that voters are not insulated by their welfare systems.
The models reveal a striking difference between the two sets of countries. In the
high welfare states the economy has a very strong impact on turnout, while the political
context variables are insignificant. In the moderate welfare states just the opposite holds
true, with the exception of inequality change all of the economic variables are
insignificant, while the political context variables both have p values below .001.
Surprisingly, even previous turnout is insignificant in the model of moderate welfare
states, indicating substantial volatility in turnout rates within these countries. The model
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explains a great deal of the variance in turnout so it seems that in moderate welfare states
the political context affects turnout above all else.

DISCUSSION
Prior studies of turnout have found that turnout varies as a function of the
macroeconomy. But, without the inclusion of a measure of economic distribution it was
impossible to empirically illustrate how or why this change in turnout came about.
Considering the well documented socioeconomic bias, which finds that the affluent are
much more likely to vote than are their lower class counterparts, it becomes apparent that
the overall level of the economy in itself cannot explain variance in turnout. It is the
impact that macroeconomic changes have on the finances of the socioeconomic groups
that can best explain the economy’s effect on turnout. When economic inequality is
small more people will have the economic security and opportunity to participate
politically, whereas increases in the level of economic inequality consolidate economic
resources in the hands of a few who are already predisposed to vote while pulling
resources from the lower classes whose propensity to vote is predicated on their
economic standing.
The analysis presented here has offered empirical evidence to support this
theoretical notion. In the models presented above the level of economic growth was
found to be a significant predictor of turnout, just as in prior analyses of the economy and
turnout. But, in models that account for change in the level of economic inequality GDP
change was found to be insignificant. Thus, it is safe to assume that the effect of
economic growth on turnout is largely the end result of economic growth altering the
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level of inequality. While it might be argued that economic growth and economic
inequality are highly correlated further analysis reveals that this is not the case.8
Perhaps the most intriguing results were those regarding the level of welfare state
development. As previously stated when inequality change is accounted for the level of
welfare state development does not matter in the way that Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and
Radcliff (1995b) have found. But, even when accounting for changing inequality welfare
state development is far from irrelevant as was hypothesized here. Once inequality
change is accounted for, the economy has a significant impact on turnout in the high
welfare states and has an insignificant effect in the moderate welfare states, while the
opposite is true for the political context variables. In short, the economy matters in the
high welfare states and the political context matters in the moderate welfare states. In
many ways this is counterintuitive. In high welfare states the public is provided with a
safety net and a greater portion of basic necessities are provided for, yet these are the
countries where the economy is most important in determining turnout. In the moderate
welfare states where there is less of a safety net, economic factors are not significant
predictors of voter turnout (with the exception of inequality change).
While this is assuredly a topic that requires further investigation, an initial
plausible explanation merits discussion. It is quite possible that those countries that are
grouped into the high welfare category are also those countries where economic issues
are of greater concern for voters, which would explain why those countries have high
welfare systems to begin with. This amounts to somewhat of a selection bias argument in
that high welfare states are also those states where the economy matters most. Perhaps
this is because of a political culture that places the emphasis for economic success or
8

See Appendix A
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failure on the individual. However, the analysis presented here does not speak explicitly
to this theoretical explanation of the clear divergence between high and moderate welfare
states. Further research will be necessary to explore this interesting relationship.
The findings here may also have important implications for economic voting. It is
often assumed that positive economic performance by the government is rewarded and
when there is economic decline the incumbent government is punished for it in the next
election. While in general this proposition may be true it does not account for changes in
turnout. Given the generally accepted fact that political participation is positively related
to income, during economic recessions “many of the people who would otherwise have
‘punished’ the government will not turnout” according to Radcliff (1992, 451). Radcliff
(1994) investigates this conjecture and finds that there is a “positivity bias” in that
governments are heavily rewarded for economic success but not readily punished for
economic decline. The analysis here would tend to support this “positivity bias” based
upon changes in electorate composition alone. As inequality rises the propensity to
turnout is reduced amongst those most adversely affected by the heightened levels of
inequality.
This prospect is quite discomforting considering the downward spiral that could
result if policies that engender greater economic inequality are not punished. Inequality
could continue to rise and purge a higher proportion of the lower classes from the
electorate, which would in turn make the future electoral costs of inegalitarian policies
even lower. Overtime, economic inequality would steadily increase and turnout rates
would steadily fall. In the aggregate this appears to be more than just a theoretical
notion. The declining rate of turnout over the past three decades has been documented
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repeatedly, but what has not been nearly as documented is the fact that inequality within
countries has risen over the same time period (Wade 2004; Hongyi, Squire and Zou 1998;
APSA Task Force).
The APSA Task Force Report on American Democracy in an Age of Rising
Inequality states:
Indeed, trends in all three areas—citizen voice, government decision making, and public policy—
may together be amplifying the influence of the few and promoting government unresponsiveness
to the values and needs of the many. Such a negative spiral can, in turn, prompt Americans to
become increasingly discouraged about the effectiveness of democratic governance, spreading
cynicism and withdrawal from elections and other arenas of public life. (APSA Task Force
Report 2004, 655).

The evidence presented here points to the precise ‘negative spiral’ identified by the task
force. Moreover, this analysis includes not only the United States, but also a cross
section of 19 other industrialized democracies. Table 4 illustrates the mean levels of
inequality and turnout over the past three decades for the nations analyzed here. The
table shows a clear and consistent increase in inequality over the same time period that
turnout fell steadily. This provides at least circumstantial evidence that the industrial
democracies may be caught in a downward cycle of inequality and turnout. Economic
inequality is thus offered here as a plausible explanation for the international decline in
turnout during the last three decades of the 20th century.

Table 4
Comparison of GDP and inequality means by decade
Decade
Inequality
Turnout
1970-79
.332
.8059
1980-89

.353

.7769

1990-2000

.371

.7313
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In order to provide further support for this conjecture future research is needed to
investigate the effect of inequality on incumbent vote swing. As this analysis has shown
it will be necessary to control for turnout levels in order to separate turnout effects from
actual preferences for incumbent parties. If it is found that turnout fluctuations are the
leading determinant of support for incumbent parties, as Radcliff (1994) hypothesizes,
then it would be reasonable to assume that the downward spiral between turnout and
inequality is a reality in the industrialized democracies. This possibility would be
particularly disturbing considering that perhaps the best remedy for low turnout,
compulsory voting (Lijphart, 1997), would have to be enacted by those who benefit most
from the elevated levels of inequality.
Accordingly, it would be advisable to test the proposition that heightened turnout
levels do in fact lead to reductions in inequality. Pacek and Radcliff (1995a) have shown
that voter turnout is positively related to the vote for left-of-center parties, but the
question remains whether those leftist parties are actually furthering the cause of
egalitarianism. Leftist parties have been found to appeal more to their affluent
constituents than to their lower class constituents (Verba, et. al. 1996). Turnout is only
valuable in reducing levels of inequality if the demands of voters are translated into
policy outputs. However, if electoral salience is high and the previously mentioned
notion regarding government’s ability to shape the level of inequality is accurate, then
heightened turnout could be one of the most important determinants of levels of
inequality. This would provide significant empirical support for the normative claims
made by compulsory voting advocates.
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CONCLUSIONS
The substantive conclusions of this analysis are quite clear. First, when analyzing
the influence of the economy on turnout change in the level of economic distribution is
much more important than change in economic growth. Second, when comparing the
industrialized democracies, variations in turnout are best explained by the institutional
and political context of elections. Yet, even when accounting for these factors inequality
remains a significant and powerful predictor of turnout. In fact, inequality is by far the
most significant economic explanation of turnout tested here. Third, the level of welfare
state development conditions the way in which the political and economic variables affect
turnout. The economic variables are significant in high welfare states, whereas the
political context variables are the principal explanatory variables in moderate welfare
states. But, inequality is significant in both models possibly indicating that the welfare
effects identified by Radcliff are primarily the result of inequality effects. Fourth, the
incidence of increases in inequality alongside reductions in turnout over the past three
decades provides justification for the inclusion of inequality and turnout in analyses of
incumbent vote swings in order to determine if the industrial democracies are caught in a
cycle of economic punishment for the lower classes and reward for the incumbent
government.
Last, the inequality findings suggest that comparative studies of turnout should
consider levels of economic inequality. While comparative studies of turnout in the
industrialized countries are common, recent research has begun to investigate other
regions of the world, such as Latin America (Fornos et al. 2004; Kinsey and Schraufnagel
2005). The effects of inequality fluctuations on turnout in Latin America will be

39

particularly important due to the regions notoriously high levels of economic inequality.
With the new UTIP dataset, reliable and consistent inequality figures are now available
for more countries than ever before, and it will be exciting to see if the effects of
inequality on turnout identified in this analysis apply to countries beyond the
industrialized sample utilized here.
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APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL ANALYSES FOR THE INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
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CORRELATION MATRIX

Unemplo
GDP
Inequality
yment
Previous Majority Competiti
Change Change Inflation Change Turnout Status
veness
GDP
Change
Inequality
Change

Inflation

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation

Sig. (2-tailed)
Unemploy
Pearson
ment
Correlation
Change
Sig. (2-tailed)
Previous
Pearson
Turnout
Correlation
Majority
Status

Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation

1

0.084

-0.123 -0.519**

.031

.285**

.259**

-

.292

.093

.000

.675

.000

.000

.084
.292

1
-

-.122
.125

.058
.464

-.233**
.003

-.033
.673

-.136
.090

-.123

-.122

1

.072

.185*

-.108

-.085

.093

.125

-

.327

.012

.139

.256

-.519**
.000

.058
.464

.072
.327

1
-

-.016
.825

-.149*
.041

-.119
.114

.031

-.233**

.185*

-.016

1

.045

.224**

.675

.003

.012

.825

-

.543

.003

.285**

-.033

-.108

-.149*

.045

1

.565*

Sig. (2-tailed)
Competitive Pearson
ness
Correlation

.000

.673

.139

.041

.543

-

.000

.259**

-.136

-.085

-.119

.224**

.565**

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.090

.256

.114

.003

.000

-

**- Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
*- Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

N

Range

Standard
Minimum Maximum Mean
Deviation
.19
-.07
.12
.0221
.02747

GDP Change

191

Inequality Change

163

.0802

-.03

.0502

.001900

.0086685

Current Inflation

190

.87

.00

.87

.0949

.11414

Unemployment Change

189

1.8

-.54

1.26

.0626

.24613

Previous Turnout

186

.6

.36

.95

.7807

.12037

Majority Status

192

.61

-.5

.11

-.1496

.11151

Competitiveness

179

.69

-.41

.28

.0640

.10703
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APPENDIX B: COUNTRIES AND ELECTION YEARS INCLUDED IN THE
ANALYSIS
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COUNTRY

ELECTION YEARS

Australia

1972 1974 1975 1977 1980 1983 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998

Austria

1971 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999

Belgium

1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991

Canada

1972 1974 1979 1980 1984 1988 1993 1997

Denmark

1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998

Finland

1972 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999

France

1978 1981 1986 1988

Germany

1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994

Greece

1974 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1996

Iceland

1971 1974 1978 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995

Ireland

1973 1977 1981 1982 1987 1989 1992 1997

Italy

1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996

Luxembourg

1974 1979 1984 1989 1994

Netherlands

1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998

Norway

1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997

Portugal

1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987

Spain

1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996

Sweden

1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998

United Kingdom 1970 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997
United States

1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996

45

LIST OF REFERENCES
Abramson, P. (1995). ‘Political Participation.’ In The Encyclopedia of Democracy, ed.
Lipset, S. 4 vols. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
Ackaert, J. and De Winter, L. (1993). ‘De afwezigen hebben andermaal ongelijk: De
stemverzaking in Vlaanderen op 24 november 1991.’ In Kiezen is verliezen:
Onderzoek naar de politieke opvattingen van Vlamingen, ed. Swyngedouw, M.,
Billiet, J., Carton, A. and Beerten, R. Leuven: Acco.
Aguilar, E. and Pacek, A. (2000). ‘Macroeconomic conditions, voter turnout, and the
working class/economically disadvantaged party vote in developing countries.’
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 33, no. 8, pp. 995-1017.
Anderson, C. (2000). ‘Economic voting and political context: a comparative perspective.’
Electoral Studies, vol. 19, pp. 151-170.
APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy (2004). ‘American
Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality.’ Perspectives on Politics, vol. 2, no. 4,
pp. 651-666.
Arneson, B. (1925). ‘Non-Voting in a Typical Ohio Community.’ American Political
Science Review, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 816-825.
Baloyra, E. and Martz, J. (1979). Political Attitudes in Venezuela: Societal Cleavages
and Political Opinion. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Beck, N., and Katz, J. (1995). ‘What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section
data.’ The American Political Science Review, vol. 89, no. 3, pp. 634-647.
Blais, A. (2000). To vote or not to vote: the merits and limits of rational choice theory.
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Blais, A. and Carty, R. (1990). ‘Does proportional representation foster turnout?’
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 18, pp. 167-181.
Blais, A. and Dobrzynska A. (1990). ‘Turnout in Electoral Democracies.’ European
Journal of Political Research, vol. 33, pp. 239-261.
Boyd, R. (1981). ‘The Decline of US Voter Turnout: Structural Explanations.’ American
Politics Quarterly, vol. 9, pp. 133-159.
Dalton, R. (1996). Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced
Industrial Democracies. 2nd ed. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Deininger, K. and Squire, L. (1996). ‘A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality.’
The World Bank Economic Review.
De Winter, L. and Ackaert, J. (1994). ‘Abstentionnisme electoral et vote blanc ou nul: Le
‘non-vote’ en Wallonie.’ In Elections la felure? Enquete sur le comportement
electoral des Wallons et des Francophones, ed. Frognier, A., and Vaerenbergh,
M. Brussels: De Boeck.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper Collins.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
Filer, J., Kenny, L., and Morton, R. (1993). ‘Redistribution, income, and voting.’
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 37, pp. 63-87.
Fornos, C., Power, T., and Garand, J. (2004). ‘Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin
America, 1980 to 2000.’ Comparative Political Studies, vol. 37, no. 8 (Oct), pp.
909-940.

46

Freeman, R. (2004). ‘What, me vote?’ In Social inequality, ed. Neckerman, K. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Franklin, M. (2002). ‘Electoral Participation.’ In Comparing Democracies: Elections and
Voting in Global Perspective, ed. LeDuc, L., Niemi, R., and Norris P. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Galbraith, J. and Kum, H. (2004). ‘Estimating the Inequality of Household Incomes: A
Statistical Approach to the Creation of a Dense and Consistent Global Data Set.’
UTIP Working Paper No. 22. < http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/web/
workingpaper/UTIP22-RIW5.pdf>
Gates, J. (2000). ‘Frank Talks on Free Trade.’ The SustainAbility Network & Core Team.
23 Mar. 2005 <http://www.sustainability.com/news/articles/core-team-andnetwork/jeff-gates-free-trade.asp>
Goodhart, C. and Bhansali, R. (1970). ‘Political economy.’ Political Studies, vol. 18, pp.
43-106.
Gosnell, Harold (1930). ‘Popular Participation in Swiss National Council Elections.’ The
American Political Science Review, vol. 24, no. 2 (May), pp. 426-439.
Hongyi, L., Squire, L. and Zou, H. (1998). ‘Explaining International and Intertemporal
Variations in Income Inequality.’ The Economic Journal, vol. 108, no. 446 (Jan),
pp. 26-43.
Jackman, R. (1987). ‘Political institutions and voter turnout in the industrial
democracies.’ American Political Science Review, vol. 81, pp. 405-423.
Jackman, R. and Miller, R. (1995). ‘Voter turnout in the industrialized democracies
during the 1980’s.’ Comparative Political Studies, vol. 12, pp. 13-27.
Kinsey, B. and Schraufnagel, S. (2005). ‘Voter Turnout in Central and South America.’
Presented at the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans. January
2005.
Kramer, G. (1971). ‘Short-term fluctuations in U.S. voting behavior, 1896-1964.’
American Political Science Review, vol. 65, pp. 131-43.
Levy, F. (1993). ‘Distribution of Income.’ The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. 3
Mar. 1999 < http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ DistributionofIncome.html>
Lewis-Beck, M. and Stegmaier, M. (2000). ‘Economic Determinants of Electoral
Outcomes.’ Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 3, pp. 183-219.
Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies: Patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in
twenty-one countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lijphart, A. (1994a). Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven
Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lijphart, A. (1994b). ‘Democracies: Forms, Performance, and Constitutional
Engineering.’ European Journal of Political Research, vol. 25, pp. 1-17.
Lijphart, A. (1997). ‘Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma.’ The
American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 1 (March), pp 1-14.
Linder, W. (1994). Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural
Societies. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Marsh, A., and Kaase, M. (1979). ‘Background of Political Action.’ In Political Action:
Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies, ed. Barnes, S. and Kaase, M.
Beveryly Hills, CA: Sage.

47

McAllister, I. (1986). ‘Compulsory Voting, Turnout and Party Advantage in Australia.’
Politics, vol. 21, pp. 89-93.
Mottier, V. (1993). ‘La structuration sociale de la participation aux votations federales.’
In Citoyennete et democratie directe: Competence, participation et decision des
citoyens et citoyennes suisses, ed. Kriesi, H. Zurich: Seismo.
Mueller, J. (1970). ‘Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson.’ American Political
Science Review, vol. 64, pp. 18-34.
Mutz, D. and Mondak, J. (1997). ‘Dimensions of Sociotropic Behavior: Group-Based
Judgements of Fairness and Well-Being.’ American Journal of Political Science,
vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 284-308.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Oppenhuis, E. (1995). Voting Behavior in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral
Participation and Party Choice. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
Pacek, A. and Radcliff B. (1995a). ‘Turnout and the Vote for Left-of-Centre Parties: A
Cross-National Analysis.’ British Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, no. 1
(Jan), pp. 137-143.
Pacek, A. and Radcliff, B. (1995b). ‘Economic Voting and the Welfare State: A CrossNational Analysis.’ The Journal of Politics, vol. 57, no. 1 (Feb), pp. 44-61.
Pacek, A. and Radcliff, B. (1995c). ‘The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in
the Developing World.’ American Journal of Political Science, vol. 39, no. 3
(Aug.), pp. 745-59.
Palmer, H. and Whitten G. (2002). ‘Economics, Politics, and the Cost of Ruling in
Advanced Industrial Democracies: How Much Does Context Matter?’ In
Economic Voting, eds. H. Dorussen and M. Taylor. New York: Routledge.
Piven, F., and Cloward, R. (1988). Why Americans Don’t Vote. New York: Pantheon
Books.
Powell, G. and Whitten, G. (1993). ‘A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting:
Taking Account of the Political Context.’ American Journal of Political Science,
vol. 37, no. 2 (May), pp. 391-414.
Radcliff, B. (1992). ‘The Welfare State, Turnout, and the Economy: A Comparative
Analysis.’ The American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 2 (Jun.), pp. 44454.
Radcliff, B. (1994). ‘Reward without Punishment: Economic Conditions and the Vote.’
Political Research Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 3 (Sep), pp 721-731.
Rosenstone, S. (1982). ‘Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout.’ American Journal of
Political Science, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 25-46.
Rosenstone, S. and Hansen, J. (1993). ‘Mobilization, participation, and democracy in
America. New York: Macmillan.
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of
Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
Tingsten, H. (1937). Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics. London: P.S. King
& Son.
Topf, R. (1995). ‘Electoral Participation.’ In Citizens and the State, ed. Hans-Dieter
Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Vol. 1 of Beliefs in Government. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.

48

Verba, S. (1996). ‘The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American
Democracy.’ American Political Science Review, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 1-7.
Verba, S., Nie, N., and Kim, J. (1978). Participation and Political Equality: A SevenNation Comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wade, R. (2004). ‘Is globalization reducing poverty and inequality?’ World Development,
vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 567-589.

49

